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INTRODUCTION 
In Triangulating Judicial Responsiveness, Chad Oldfather, Joseph 
Bockhorst, and Brian Dimmer give us a methodology by which we can 
empirically assess (among other things) the effects that argumentation 
has on judicial decision making.1 Unlike the vast majority of empirical 
legal scholarship of judging, the authors do not use this methodology in 
their current study to compare “legalist” explanations of judging with 
“realist” explanations of judging.2 Rather, the study operates almost 
entirely within the “legalist” frame. This is a welcome development for 
many reasons, one on which this Response focuses—the authors’ 
methodology illustrates a way of scientifically “testing” descriptive 
legal theory claims, and it suggests an empirical way out of some 
longstanding theoretical disputes.  
I.  LEGAL THEORY AND LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 
Because many legal theory claims are primarily philosophical, their 
acceptance or rejection generally depends on what Thomas Ulen calls 
an “appeal to hypothetical-deductive argument,” rather than empirical 
testing.3 As a result, we tend to evaluate an existing legal theory based 
on whether a more logically and/or morally persuasive legal theory 
                                                                                                                     
 * Robert G. Lawson Associate Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. I would like 
to thank Chad Oldfather for inviting me to be part of the panel at SEALS where I was exposed 
to his research in its early stages, and the Florida Law Review for inviting me to comment on 
Triangulating Judicial Responsiveness. Thanks also to my colleague Justin Wedeking for 
helpful comments.  
 1. Chad M. Oldfather, Joseph P. Bockhorst, & Brian P. Dimmer, Triangulating Judicial 
Responsiveness: Automated Content Analysis, Judicial Opinions, and the Methodology of Legal 
Scholarship, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1189 (2012).  
 2. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK (2008) (explaining the differences 
between “legalist” and “realist” theories of judicial decision making).  
 3. See Thomas S. Ulen, A Nobel Prize in Legal Science: Theory, Empirical Work, and 
the Scientific Method in the Study of Law, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 875, 896 n.65, 912 (2002).  
60 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW FORUM [Vol. 64 
 
exists. The familiar statement of this process is the axiom, often stated 
in legal scholarly workshops,4 and in some scholarly articles, that “it 
takes a theory to beat a theory.”5  
This axiom seems particularly appropriate to critiques of normative 
philosophical claims. But if a legal theory is instead an explanation of 
some feature of the observable world and an accompanying set of 
predictions about how that world operates, then it is certainly possible 
for such a theory to be incorrect (or incomplete) even if a rival theory 
has not yet risen up to take its place.6 For example, political scientists 
and legal realists in the legal academy have posited for decades that 
judging is influenced by non-legal factors such as politics and judicial 
ideology.7 This claim is, at bottom, a descriptive claim about the 
observable world, a claim which might be verified or questioned based 
on empirical research. Indeed, scores of empirical studies attempt to 
assess the influence of politics and other non-legal factors on the 
outcomes of cases.8  
                                                                                                                     
 4. Larry Solum’s Legal Theory Lexicon sets forth a useful summary of the axiom, its use, 
and the best responses to it, in the workshop context. See Lawrence Solum, Legal Theory 
Lexicon: It Takes a Theory to Beat a Theory, LEGAL THEORY BLOG (Oct. 21, 2012), 
http://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/2012/10/introduction-it-takes-a-theory-to-beat-a-theory-
this-is-surely-one-of-the-top-ten-all-time-comments-uttered-by-law-professo.html . 
 5. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Common Law, Labor Law, and Reality: A Rejoinder to 
Professors Getman and Kohler, 92 YALE L.J. 1435, 1435 (1983) (using the axiom to question 
critics of his then-recent article); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CINN. L. 
REV. 849, 855 (1989) (using a variant of the axiom—“You can’t beat somebody with 
nobody”—to question theoretical critiques of originalism). Perhaps the most thoughtful analysis 
of the axiom in the pages of a law review comes from Professor James Ryan, who uses the 
axiom as the foundation of a persuasive critique of two recent books on constitutional 
interpretation. See James E. Ryan, Does it Take a Theory? Originalism, Active Liberty, and 
Minimalism, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1623 (2006) (reviewing STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: 
INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2005); Cass R. Sunstein, RADICALS IN ROBES: 
WHY EXTREME RIGHT-WING COURTS ARE WRONG FOR AMERICA (2005)). The axiom has also 
been called into question in the literature as a form of “physics envy.” See Daniel Farber, 
Toward a New Legal Realism, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 279, 295 (2001) (reviewing CASS R. 
SUNSTEIN, ED., BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (2000) and questioning the claim of rational 
choice theorists that behavioralist critiques of the rational choice theory should be rejected 
because “it takes a theory to beat a theory, and . . . the behavioralists have only assembled a 
collection of empirical regularities without any unifying theory”). Taking these treatments 
together, one can surmise that the axiom is particularly appropriate to normative debates over 
how the constitution should be interpreted (because “no interpretive theory” is generally not an 
option in that context), but may not be appropriate to debates over descriptive theoretical claims 
that may be subjected to empirical testing.  
 6. See Ulen, supra note 3, at 911–12 (focusing on theories that include empirically 
verifiable predictions of the consequences of adopting legal rules).  
 7. See generally Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The New Legal Realism, 75 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 831 (2008).  
 8. See Bryan D. Lammon, What We Talk About When We Talk About Ideology: Judicial 
Politics Scholarship and Naive Legal Realism, 83 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 231, 236 n.15 (2009) 
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Most such studies state descriptive conclusions regarding the 
significance of the influence of measured variables on decision making, 
along with general conclusions as to the importance of the findings for 
the rule of law.9 As Brian Tamanaha points out, though, in offering 
value judgments regarding the implications of non-legal factors’ 
influencing judging, the existing studies of judicial decision making 
omit a necessary first step—they fail to define “rule of law baselines.”10 
That is, without an agreed starting point that reflects a consensus about 
the proper drivers of judicial decisions, it is impossible to know whether 
we should be concerned about a statistically significant finding that 
ideology, or politics, or some other legal factor influences decision 
making. Put another way, while the existing studies tell us lots about 
statistical significance, they tell us less about practical significance. 
Setting baselines bridges this gap.  
II.  SETTING BASELINES AND “TESTING” THEM 
Baselines, it seems, will inevitably have their foundations in positive 
legal theory claims. For us to agree that a particular statement of the 
rule of law is indeed a baseline, we must be able to verify that the 
statement accurately describes an element of the rule of law. 
Triangulating Judicial Responsiveness illustrates one way in which 
such verification can proceed empirically. Lon Fuller’s The Forms and 
Limits of Adjudication makes up a significant part of the theoretical 
grounding for the methodology the authors design.11 Drawing from the 
“forms” section of Fuller’s paper, the authors essentially take as a 
verifiable rule-of-law baseline that, for a decision making process to 
count as “adjudication,” it must engage the parties through the 
“presentation of proofs and reasoned arguments.”12 They then construct 
measures of “judicial responsiveness,” which employ content analysis 
to measure the judge’s attention to the parties’ arguments and the 
authorities on which the parties rely in making their arguments.13  
The authors’ analysis proceeds on the assumption that, where a 
judge is “strongly responsive,” it is likely that the parties’ right to 
participation through proofs and reasoned arguments has been 
                                                                                                                     
(collecting numerous law review articles presenting empirical findings on judicial decision 
making as of 2009).  
 9. See, e.g., Miles & Sunstein, supra note 7, at 844 (commenting on the rule-of-law 
implications of judicial politics scholarship).  
 10. See Brian Z. Tamanaha, Devising Rule of Law Baselines: The Next Step in 
Quantitative Studies of Judging, THE LEGAL WORKSHOP, DUKE LAW JOURNAL (March 25, 2010),  
http://legalworkshop.org/..  
 11. Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353 (1978).  
 12. See Fuller, supra note 11, at 365.  
 13. Oldfather, Bockhorst, & Dimmer, supra note 1, at 1221–25.  
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fulfilled.14 The results of their study show that the authors’ 
methodology is a good measure of judicial responsiveness, based on 
correlations between manually coded cases and cases coded based on 
automated content analysis, as designed by the authors.15 The authors 
go on to suggest that their methodology can be used to establish 
“baselines” of judicial responsiveness from which we might evaluate 
the “quality” of judicial decision making, and that is certainly true.16 
But the really exciting potential uses for this methodology, in my view, 
will involve “testing” the underlying rule-of-law baselines on which it is 
founded. For example, if studies of judicial responsiveness show 
through content analysis that judges are, as a general matter, weakly 
responsive or even non-responsive, then such findings may call into 
question Fuller’s descriptive legal theory claim itself.  
Even accepting Fuller’s primary descriptive claim about 
adjudication’s “forms,” we might draw from the “limits” portion of 
Fuller’s article a set of testable predictions. Fuller’s “limits” argument 
focuses on “polycentric” problems—problems that cannot be solved 
without affecting many related matters, most of which will not be 
known to the court.17 Fuller predicts that, where an arbiter is faced with 
a polycentric problem, the arbiter will take one of two actions. The 
arbiter may alter the process to fit the problem, for example by allowing 
non-parties to present arguments, or by guessing at facts on which the 
parties are unable to offer proofs.18 Or, the arbiter may alter the problem 
to fit the process, for example by converting political resource 
allocation claims into claims of right.19  
Measuring correlations between the language of briefs and judicial 
orders may allow us to see whether judges are in fact altering processes 
to fit polycentric claims, or claims to fit the adjudicatory process. 
Taking Fuller’s “forms” as a baseline, we might than draw empirical 
conclusions as to whether certain types of claims are suitable for 
adjudication, or are better suited for political decision making or private 
ordering, or whether concerns over the adjudication of political-
sounding controversies are in fact not well-founded. Such studies might 
one day provide an empirical foundation for the political question 
doctrine, for example, or a foundation for its rejection.20 Of particular 
interest to those of us who study institutional reform litigation, the 
                                                                                                                     
 14. Id. at 1221.  
 15. Id. at 1236–37.  
 16. Id. at 1238.  
 17. See Fuller, supra note 11, at 394–95.  
 18. Id. at 401.  
 19. Id. at 401–03.  
 20. See generally Louis Henkin, Is There a “Political Question” Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 
597 (1976) (theorizing “there may be no doctrine requiring abstention from judicial review of 
‘political questions’”).  
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authors’ methodology perhaps presents us with a new way to evaluate 
our descriptive and consequential claims about this form of 
adjudication, moving beyond the current empirical studies, which focus 
heavily on the “success” or “failure” of such litigation in causing large-
scale change,21 and toward more systematic examinations of the actual 
effects that such litigation has on the adjudicatory process.  
CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, numerous uses likely exist for the methodology 
developed in Triangulating Judicial Responsiveness, many of which the 
authors anticipate.22 My modest aim here has been to connect up the 
concepts of setting baselines for empirical evaluations with some more 
ambitious potential uses for this methodology, some of which will 
involve testing and potentially rejecting some of these very baselines 
themselves. Fuller provides a useful set of baselines with which to start, 
and Trangulating Judicial Responsiveness provides a promising way to 
test and evaluate these baselines.  
                                                                                                                     
 21. See, e.g., MATTHEW E. K. HALL, THE NATURE OF SUPREME COURT POWER (2011) 
(finding, based on empirical analysis, that the Supreme Court can be an effective agent of large-
scale social change where its rulings can be directly implemented by lower courts, or where the 
public will does not stand opposed to the Court’s rulings); GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE 
HOLLOW HOPE (2d ed. 2008) (questioning the enterprise of institutional reform litigation based 
on an empirical evaluation of its results).  
 22. See Oldfather, Bockhorst, & Dimmer, supra note 1, at 1238–41.  
